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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] On October 23, 2007, the United States announced an initiative to 
strengthen intellectual property enforcement measures within the 
international community via the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(“ACTA”).1  During the following years, eleven rounds of negotiations 
among as many parties2 culminated in a finalized text released on 
December 3, 2010.3  The dialogue occurred outside the purview of 
                                                
1 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE FACTS: ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) (Aug. 4, 2008), 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2008/asset_upload_file760_150
84.pdf. 
 
2 See ACTA Negotiations: Report on Round Eleven, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
& TRADE, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Relationships-
and-Agreements/Anti-Counterfeiting/0-acta-negotiations11.php (last updated Oct. 4, 
2010). 
 
3 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE 
AGREEMENT (2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2417 [hereinafter 
FINAL TEXT]. 
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existing bodies such as the WIPO and WTO.4  The ACTA now awaits 
acceptance following the March 31, 2011 commencement of the 
ratification period.5  It will enter into force thirty days following the sixth 
formal approval.6 
 
[2] The Members of the European Parliament hinted toward 
acceptance of the ACTA, but simultaneously expressed hesitation, when 
they referred to the ACTA as “a step in the right direction,” yet sought 
confirmation from the European Commission that the treaty would not 
affect current EU legislation.7  The EU joined ten others as an intimate 
participant in ACTA negotiations, though the agreement identifies thirty-
eight distinct political entities as potential signatories.8  Presumably, all 
will ratify the agreement they helped create.   
 
[3] The ACTA is a plurilateral agreement, meaning it binds fewer 
parties than that of a traditional multilateral agreement.9  The ACTA 
attempts to establish international standards on intellectual property rights 
enforcement and combat the “proliferation of counterfeit and pirated 
goods.”10  Japan and the United States created the initial momentum for 
                                                
4 See Danny O’Brien, Blogging ACTA Across The Globe: The View from France, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/01/acta-and-
france. 
 
5 FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 6, art. 39. 
 
6 See id. at ch. 6, art. 40. 
 
7 See Press Release, European Parliament, Anti-Counterfeiting Accord: MEPs Set Out 
Content Conditions for Ratifying the Deal (Nov. 24, 2010), available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20101124IPR99549/20101124
IPR99549_en.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
8 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 6, art. 39 n.17. 
 
9 See generally Michael Geist, The ACTA Threat To The Future Of WIPO, INTELL. 
PROP. WATCH (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/14/the-acta-
threat-to-the-future-of-wipo/ (noting that the ACTA’s plurilateral status handily 
circumvents potential WIPO restrictions regarding multilateral agreements). 
 
10 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at pmbl. 
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the ACTA, but other countries soon joined the negotiations.11  By the time 
official negotiations began, the parties included “Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and the United 
States.”12 
 
[4] The culmination of the negotiations was the eleventh round, hosted 
on October 2, 2010, in Tokyo, Japan.13  Several countries were notably 
absent from this negotiation, which produced the final text.  Both Jordan 
and the United Arab Emirates, though present during the first round, 
dropped out before the second.14  Perhaps more significant was China’s 
complete absence.15  China has the world’s third largest economy, but is 
also one of the largest sources of counterfeit goods.16  India, the world’s 
                                                
11 See All You Want to Know About the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 
EUR. COMMISSION, 1 (Oct. 20, 2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/ 
october/tradoc_146792.pdf. 
 
12 EU, US and Others Hold Geneva Talks on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, EUR. 
COMMISSION (June 5, 2008), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/june/tradoc_ 
139086.pdf. 
 
13 Press Release, European Commission, Joint Statement from All the Negotiating Parties 
to ACTA (Oct. 2, 2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/ 
index.cfm?id=623. 
 
14 Compare EU, US and Others Hold Geneva Talks on Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, supra note 12 (summarizing round one of ACTA negotiations), with Anti-
Counterfeiting: EU, US and Others Meet in Washington to Advance ACTA, EUR. UNION, 
EU/NR 75/08 (July 31, 2008), http://www.eurunion.org/eu/2008-News-Releases/ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING-EUROPEAN-UNION-UNITED-STATES-AND-OTHERS-MEET-
IN-WASHINGTON-TO-ADVANCE-ANTI-COUNTERFEITING-TRADE-
AGREEMENT-ACTA.html (summarizing round two of ACTA negotiations). 
 
15 See Intellectual Property: Anti-Counterfeiting, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/anti-counterfeiting/ (last 
updated Dec. 20, 2010) (providing a list of countries, excluding China, that participated 
in negotiations). 
 
16 See Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), in CENT. INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2010), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html; see also Mark Litke, China 
Big in Counterfeit Goods, ABC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
WNT/story?id=130381. 
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fifth largest economy, was also absent.17  According to one Indian 
government official, they never even received an invitation to join the 
negotiations.18   
 
[5] The $272.7 million in counterfeit products seized by the U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol in 2008 could explain China and India’s 
absence from the negotiations.19  China was the principal source of seized 
goods, making up eighty-one percent of the total value seized.20  India 
ranked a distant second in overall number of seizures at six percent.21  
With so many counterfeit goods originating from China and, to a lesser 
extent, India, perhaps the negotiating parties viewed them with 
suspicion.22 
 
[6] While the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) 
describes the ACTA as “a state-of-the-art international framework that 
provides a model for effectively combating global proliferation of 
                                                
17 See Country Comparison, supra note 16; see also Intellectual Property: Anti-
Counterfeiting, supra note 15 (providing a list of countries, excluding India, that 
participated in negotiations). 
 
18 See Monika Ermert, Indian Official: ACTA Out Of Sync With TRIPS and Public 
Health, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (May 5, 2010), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2010/05/05/indian-official-acta-out-of-sync-with-trips-and-public-
health/. 
 
19 See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, SEIZURE STATISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 2008 14 (2009), available at 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/priority_trade/ipr/pubs/seizure/fy08_final_sta
t.ctt/fy08_final_stat.pdf. 
 
20 Id. 
 
21 Id. 
 
22 Commencement of negotiations predated the statistics cited, but earlier data show 
similar trends.  See id. at 12; see also Lawrence Liang, We’ve All Got Some Baggage, 7 
TEHELKA MAG., no. 45 (Nov. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main47.asp?filename=Ne131110We_ve_All.asp (stating 
that “India and China have consistently made it to the [United States Trade 
Representative] priority watch list for the past ten years . . . ”). 
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commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy,”23 the ACTA has not 
universally received such acclaim.24  This Article examines two of the 
more credible criticisms leveled against the ACTA and evaluates the 
credibility of each.  First, some allege that the agreement is a treaty 
masquerading as an executive agreement.25  The distinction is significant 
because treaties may modify U.S. law and require congressional approval, 
while executive agreements must accord with existing law and require 
only presidential approval.26  The second criticism is the systemic lack of 
transparency throughout the negotiation process.27  Though these are not 
the only criticisms – far from it – they are the two most significant and 
stand on the most solid ground.  Yet, neither poses an insurmountable 
hindrance to the ACTA.  To understand these arguments, this Article must 
first delve into the latest public text of the ACTA, published December 3, 
2010.28 
 
II.   SUMMARY OF THE FINALIZED TEXT 
 
[7] The ACTA is organized into six chapters.29  Chapter I contains 
introductory matters and definitions.30  Chapter II, the largest, contains 
most of the substantive provisions.31  Chapter III contains provisions on 
                                                
23 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE 
AGREEMENT (ACTA), available at http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
 
24 See Eddan, Katz, Stopping the ACTA Juggernaut, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 19, 
2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/11/stopping-acta-juggernaut. 
 
25 See infra Part III. 
 
26 Treaty vs. Executive Agreement, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/ 
faqs/70133.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2011). 
 
27 See infra Part IV. 
 
28 See generally FINAL TEXT, supra note 3. 
 
29 See id. 
 
30 See id. at ch. 1. 
 
31 See id. at ch. 2. 
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enforcement practices.32  Chapter IV encourages international 
cooperation.33  Chapter V establishes the ACTA Committee, the 
administrative body overseeing and managing the ACTA framework.34  
Chapter VI concludes the agreement.35  Earlier versions of the ACTA 
were narrowly focused on counterfeit trademark goods, but its scope has 
gradually broadened, and now matches that of TRIPS, by including 
copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and patents.36 
 
[8] Although the ACTA will raise the minimum standard for 
intellectual property rights and enforcement measures among signatory 
countries, it does so without creating a ceiling.37  Many of the provisions 
are flexible, using language such as the permissive “may” rather than the 
mandatory “shall.”38  Similarly, although the ACTA encompasses all 
major intellectual property regimes, it treats both patents and trade secrets 
somewhat tangentially.39  A signatory nation may exclude patents and 
trade secrets from the civil enforcement section40 and the ACTA 
                                                
32 See id. at ch. 3. 
 
33 See id. at ch. 4. 
 
34 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 5. 
 
35 See id. at ch. 6. 
 
36 Id. at pmbl. (applying the ACTA to all “intellectual property rights”); see also Mart 
Kuhn, Intellectual Property Owners Oppose Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement, PUB. 
KNOWLEDGE (July 14, 2010, 10:50 AM), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/ip-
owners-oppose-acta (stating that the ACTA “has expanded far beyond its stated intended 
purpose . . .”).  
 
37 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 1, art. 2. 
 
38 See, e.g., id. at ch. 2, § 2, art. 8 (“[A] Party may limit the remedies available . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 
39 See id. at ch. 2, § 2 n.2.  
 
40 See id. at ch 2, § 1.  India, among others, opposed the inclusion of patented goods in 
the Civil Enforcement section, arguing that doing so would impede trade of otherwise 
legal generic pharmaceuticals.  See Concerns Raised over ACTA at TRIPS Council, 
THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Nov. 1, 2010), available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/ 
title2/intellectual_property/info.service/2010/ipr.info.101102.htm. 
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affirmatively deems them “outside the scope” of the border measures 
section.41  The sections on civil enforcement and border measures, 
arguably the two most substantive of all, dilute the ACTA’s strength in 
fighting patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation.42  
Conversely, the sections governing criminal enforcement, enforcement in 
the digital environment, enforcement practices, and international 
cooperation exclude neither patents nor trade secrets.43 
 
A.  Chapter One: Initial Provisions and General Definitions 
 
[9] The provisions of the ACTA take into consideration superseding 
prior treaties, notably the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).44  Indeed, the ACTA inherits its 
objectives and principles from TRIPS.45  Importantly, if a signatory does 
not recognize a particular intellectual property right, the ACTA creates no 
obligation to do so.46  Thus, ratifying the ACTA cannot force a signatory 
to create entire categories of intellectual property, nor can it force into 
existence an intellectual property right the signatory does not 
independently desire.47 
 
[10] Trademarks tend to be geographical creatures, and the ACTA 
recognizes this traditional limitation.48  By definition, “counterfeit 
trademark goods” include products or packaging bearing a mark identical 
                                                
41 FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 3, art. 13 n.6. 
 
42 See generally id. at ch. 2, §§ 2-3. 
  
43 See id. at ch. 2, §§ 4-5, ch. 3-4. 
 
44 See id. at ch. 1, § 1, art. 1. 
 
45 See id. at ch. 1, § 1, art. 2. 
 
46 See id. ch. 1, § 1, art. 3.  
 
47 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 1, art. 3.  
 
48 See id. at ch. 1, § 1, art. 3 (“This Agreement shall be without prejudice to provisions in 
a Party’s law governing the availability, acquisition, scope, and maintenance of 
intellectual property rights.”).  
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to or “which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from” a 
trademark registered in the signatory country.49  While the standard 
articulated by this definition differs in literal form from the “identical 
with, or substantially indistinguishable from” standard normally applied 
under U.S. trademark law,50 it seems functionally equivalent.  “[P]irated 
copyright goods” means, in essence, goods created by unauthorized 
copying, thereby infringing a copyright.51  
 
[11] Curiously, the definition for “right holder” explicitly “includes a 
federation or an association,” but conspicuously omits the author or 
inventor.52  The fact that corporate interests apparently eclipse those of 
individual content creators does nothing to assuage criticism from groups 
alleging that, though “the Agreement has huge implications for the public, 
few substantive steps have been taken to inform, engage, or even consider 
the public interest.”53 
 
B.  Chapter Two: Legal Framework for Enforcement of  
Intellectual Property Rights 
 
[12] Chapter II is the longest, most substantive segment of the 
document.54  As TRIPS has already established, each signatory must have 
general legal measures in place for enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.55  Civil remedies in each country must follow the structure 
                                                
49 Id. at ch. 1, § 2, art. 5(d). 
 
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 
51 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 2, art. 5(k). 
 
52 See id. at ch. 1, § 2, art. 5(l). 
 
53 See, e.g., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement (last visited Apr. 
16, 2011). 
 
54 See generally FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2. 
 
55 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, pt. 3, § 1, art. 41, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS]; see also FINAL TEXT, supra note 3,  at 
ch. 2, § 1, art. 6.  
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provided by the ACTA.56  While preliminary injunctions must remain 
available “to prevent goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual 
property right from entering into the channels of commerce,” there is no 
universal standard for remedy.57  Therefore, standards will likely continue 
to vary by locality.  Furthermore, all signatories are required to adopt a 
statutory system for calculating damages in copyright and trademark 
infringement cases.58  Prior to the ACTA, not all signatory countries made 
statutory damages available.59 Comparatively, U.S. law previously 
provided for statutory damages. 60  The ACTA requires attorney’s fees for 
at least copyright and trademark infringement suits, but the qualifier 
“where appropriate” renders the requirement somewhat impotent.61  
Additional remedies include confiscation and destruction of infringing 
goods.62 
 
[13] Section three of Chapter II provides for border measures to combat 
infringement of copyrights and trademarks but specifically excludes 
patents and trade secrets.63  Signatories must enable their customs agents 
to act on their own accord or at the request of a rights holder to search 
incoming goods for infringing material.64  Analysis of earlier drafts of the 
ACTA raised fears of “iPod searching border guards” – fears later allayed 
                                                
56 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 7. 
 
57 Id. at ch. 2, § 2, art. 8. 
 
58 See id. at ch. 2, § 2, art. 9. 
 
59 For example, the U.K. currently awards damages “on a case-by-case basis based on the 
actual damages incurred.”  See ACTA in the UK, TECHNOLLAMA (Oct. 16, 2010), 
http://www.technollama.co.uk/acta-in-theuk?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_ 
campaign=acta-in-the-uk. 
 
60 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)-(d) (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
 
61 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 9. 
 
62 See id. at ch. 2, § 2, art. 10. 
 
63 See id. at ch. 2, § 3, art. 13 & n.6. 
 
64 See id. at ch. 2, § 3, art. 16. 
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by the addition of a de minimis carve-out.65  Yet, perhaps that carve-out 
provides only hollow comfort in light of its permissive, rather than 
mandatory, nature.66  Furthermore, the signatory’s “competent authorities” 
may begin their own investigation to determine “whether the suspect 
goods infringe an intellectual property right.”67  That is, signatory 
countries may allow their customs agents: (1) to search an individual’s 
personal electronic device; (2) confiscate the device upon suspicion of 
infringing goods; (3) perform an internal investigation; (4) determine that 
the device in fact contains infringing goods; (5) and charge the individual 
with civil liability.68  According to Canadian law professor Michael Geist, 
throughout the ACTA negotiations, the United States “push[ed] for broad 
provisions that cover import, export, and in-transit shipments,” while other 
countries advocated softening the border-searching provision. 69 
 
[14] Section four of Chapter II, titled “Criminal Enforcement,” does not 
exclude patents and trade secrets, as did the previous two sections.70  
Signatories must provide criminal repercussions for at least commercial 
willful infringement, including either fines or jail time.71  The country’s 
authorities can seize and destroy counterfeit trademark goods and pirated 
                                                
65 See Michael Geist, ACTA's De Minimis Provision: Countering the iPod Searching 
Border Guard Fears, MICHAEL GEIST (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/ 
content/view/4900/125/. 
 
66 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 3, art. 14 (“A party may exclude from the 
application of this Section small quantities of goods of a non commercial nature 
contained in travellers’ [sic] personal luggage.”) (emphasis added). 
 
67 Id. at ch. 2, § 3, art. 19. 
 
68 See id. at ch. 2, § 3, art. 16.  It is entirely unclear to the Author how a customs agent 
would be able to have any reasonable basis to suspect that a particular song on an 
individual’s iPod was obtained without the right holder’s authorization.  Cf. id. 
(describing the actions customs authorities may take “upon their own initiative”).  
 
69 See Michael Geist, Putting Together the ACTA Puzzle: Privacy, P2P Major Targets, 
MICHAEL GEIST (Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3660/125/. 
 
70 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 4. 
 
71 See id. at ch. 2, § 4, art. 24 & n.12. 
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copyright goods “without compensation of any sort to the infringer.”72  As 
in the civil enforcement section, the ACTA also would have countries 
authorize their officials to initiate their own investigation ex officio.73 
 
[15] The fifth section, titled “Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights in the Digital Environment,” is known colloquially as the “Internet 
Chapter.”74  It extends the provisions of sections two and four to the 
context of the Internet.75  In a move that may target both commercial and 
non-commercial peer-to-peer file-sharing, the ACTA requires parties to 
take measures against “unlawful use of means of widespread distribution 
for infringing purposes.”76  Parties are authorized to order Internet service 
providers to reveal a user’s identity to a rights holder upon the filing of an 
infringement claim.77  Finally, this chapter includes provisions consistent 
with the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which spreads rights management protections 
abroad.78  
                                                
72 See id. at ch. 2, § 4, art. 25.  These provisions explicitly reference the confiscation and 
destruction of counterfeit and pirated goods, thereby inferring by omission that a 
signatory need not permit the confiscation and destruction of goods that merely infringe 
rather than counterfeit  .  See id.  
 
73 See id. at ch. 2, § 4, art. 26. 
 
74 See id. at § 5; Mike Masnick, ACTA's Internet Chapter Leaks; And, Now We See How 
Sneaky The Negotiators Have Been, TECHDIRT (Feb. 22, 2010, 11:40 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100222/0215038248.shtml. 
 
75 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 5, art. 27 (referring to the Internet has the 
“digital environment”). 
 
76 Id. 
 
77 See id.  This process mirrors the litigation strategy regularly employed by the 
Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”).  See Eric Bangeman, Leaked 
Letter Shows RIAA Pressuring ISPs, Planning Discounts for Early Settlements, 
ARSTECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/02/8832.ars (last updated Feb. 
13, 2007, 11:59 AM). 
 
78 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 5, art. 27; see also Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
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C.  Chapter Five: The ACTA Committee 
 
[16] Chapter V creates the ACTA Committee, an international 
administrative body existing separately from WIPO, the WTO, or any 
other pre-existing entity.79  The Committee reviews the ACTA’s 
implementation and operation, considers amendments, and oversees the 
accession of new signatories.80   
 
III.  EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT OR TREATY? 
 
[17] Some offices within the U.S. federal government refuse to define 
the ACTA as a treaty, but rather see it as an executive agreement.81  
Courts apply an easier ratification standard to executive agreements, 
requiring only the signature of the President, not congressional approval.82  
However, such agreements should not override federal or state law unless 
“the President has independent constitutional or statutory authority to do 
so.”83  Conversely, the agreement can properly bypass requirements for 
congressional review or approval if it contains no discrepancies with 
existing U.S. law.84  Thus, if the ACTA requires the reform of any U.S. 
law, it would be precluded from sole executive agreement status and 
                                                
79 See id. at ch. 5, art. 36; cf. O’Brien, supra note 4 (noting that “ACTA [was] negotiated 
outside of the traditional and relatively transparent IPR policy-making arenas, such as the 
WTO or WIPO”). 
 
80 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 5, art. 36. 
 
81 See, e.g., Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement on the Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through Executive 
Trade Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT’L. L. ONLINE 24, 27, 30 (2009), 
http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-35-katz-hinze-ACTA-on-knowledge-economy.pdf. 
 
82 See Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1573, 1576, 1580 (2007). 
 
83 Id. at 1655. 
 
84 See id. at 1597-98, 1660-61 (stating that executive agreements are constitutional so 
long as “such agreements--in and of themselves—[are not used by the President] as a 
basis for altering preexisting legal rights.”). 
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would have to come before Congress for approval.85  Though this would 
slow the ACTA’s already glacial pace, any added infusion of scrutiny, 
oversight, and transparency would undoubtedly meet a warm reception 
with the public interest groups currently opposed to the ACTA.  As the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation contends, “congressional advice and 
approval . . . is integral to the [C]onstitution’s delicate balance of 
executive and legislative powers.”86 
 
[18] Earlier versions of the ACTA contained provisions conflicting 
directly with U.S. law.87  Over the numerous iterations, certain provisions 
were subject to a disproportionate amount of opposition from both private 
industry and the public at large.88  The four provisions drawing the most 
fire were either removed or diluted.89  The first provision under fire 
required an international notice-and-takedown procedure similar to that 
currently existing under the DMCA.90  The second provision imposed 
third-party liability.91  The third provision instituted a graduated response, 
or “three strikes” rule, which would have required laws permanently 
                                                
85 See id. (“Unless a sole executive agreement is adopted as a ‘Treaty’ or as a ‘Law’ using 
these procedures, the Supremacy Clause does not recognize it as a basis for overriding 
existing law.”).  
 
86 Katz, supra note 24. 
 
87 See Gwen Hinze, Preliminary Analysis of the Officially Released ACTA Text, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 22, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/eff-analysis-
officially-released-acta-text.  
 
88 See id. 
 
89 See generally OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ACTA –SUMMARY OF 
KEY ELEMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION (2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/november/acta-summary-key-elements-under-discussion.  
 
90 See Michael Geist, EU ACTA Analysis Leaks: Confirms Plans For Global DMCA, 
Encourage 3 Strikes Model, MICHAEL GEIST (Nov. 30, 2009), 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4575/125/. 
 
91 See Hinze, supra note 81.  
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revoking a user’s right to Internet access after three copyright violations.92  
Finally, the fourth provision imposed mandatory criminalization of non-
commercial copyright infringement,93 as well as “‘inciting, aiding and 
abetting’” such infringement.94  None of these provisions survived to the 
ACTA’s final draft. 
 
[19] A blanket statement allowing exceptions could eliminate the 
possibility of conflict, but perhaps at the cost of reducing the entire 
agreement to impotency.  One commentator suggests circumventing any 
inconsistencies with an article that allows signatories to create exceptions 
“necessary to address the objectives and principles of the TRIPS 
agreement.”95  Indeed, the USTR, which represented the United States in 
ACTA negotiations, argued that Chapter I, Article 2 allows lawmakers to 
ignore any provisions of the agreement that might require reform, thereby 
removing any need for the United States to change domestic law.96  The 
USTR refers to the same language used in TRIPS: “[Members] shall be 
free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions 
of this Agreement within its own legal system and practice.”97  The fatal 
                                                
92 See Gwen Hinze, Leaked ACTA Internet Provisions: Three Strikes and a Global 
DMCA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 3, 2009), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/11/ 
leaked-acta-internet-provisions-three-strikes-and-. 
 
93 Leak: EU Pushes for Criminalizing Non-Commercial Usages in ACTA, LA 
QUADRATURE DU NET (June 24, 2010), http://www.laquadrature.net/en/leak-eu-pushes-
for-criminalizing-non-commercial-usages-in-acta.  
 
94 Id. 
 
95 See James Love, Areas Where the Oct 2, 2010 ACTA Text Is Inconsistent with U.S. 
Law, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Oct. 9, 2010, 9:59 AM), 
http://keionline.org/node/970 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
96 See James Love, USTR's Implausible Claim that ACTA Article 1.2 Is an All Purpose 
Loophole, and the Ramifications If True, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Oct. 22, 2010, 
2:23 PM), http://keionline.org/node/990; see also FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 1, 
art. 2. 
 
97 Compare FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 1, art. 2; with TRIPS, supra note 55, at 
pt. 1, art. 1. 
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flaw to the strategy is that, in the context of TRIPS, the language has been 
found to not be a free pass from compliance.98   
 
[20] In fact, on October 8, 2010, Senator Wyden asked a branch of the 
Library of Congress for an analysis of the October 2 ACTA text to 
evaluate whether any conflicts existed with then-current U.S. law.99  The 
USTR had previously assured Senator Wyden that the ACTA does not 
provide “a vehicle for changing U.S. law,” but instead would “provide 
appropriate flexibility.”100  Shortly thereafter, on October 19, 2010, 
Senators Bernard Sanders and Sherrod Brown requested a similar analysis 
from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”),101 which 
advises the executive branch on intellectual property policy.102  Director 
David Kappos replied with a letter dated November 12, 2010103 that 
Senator Sanders described as a “non-response” for its lack of any firm 
                                                
98 See Carlos Correa, Developing Countries and the TRIPS Agreement, THIRD WORLD 
NETWORK (1999), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/correa-cn.htm (Any deviation from the 
standards set forth by the Agreement may lead to a dispute settlement procedure within 
the WTO . . . . ).   
 
99 Letter from Ron Wyden, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Karen Lewis, Assistant Dir., Am. 
Law Div., Cong. Research Serv./Library of Cong. (Oct. 8, 2010), available at 
http://wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sen%20Wyden%20Request%20for%20Legal%2
0Review%20of%20ACTA%20Oct%202010.pdf. 
 
100 Letter from Ron Kirk, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Representative, to Ron Wyden, 
Senator, U.S. Senate (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://wyden.senate.gov/imo/ 
media/doc/USTR%20Response%20to%20ACTA%20Letter.pdf. 
 
101 Letter from Bernard Sanders, Senator, U.S. Senate, and Sherrod Brown, Senator, U.S. 
Senate, to David Kappos, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Oct. 19, 2010), 
available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/senator_sanders_brown_kappos_ 
19oct2010.pdf. 
 
102 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR EXTERNAL 
AFFAIRS (EA), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ip/index.jsp (last updated 
Jan. 13, 2011). 
 
103 See Letter from David Kappos, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Bernard 
Sanders, Senator, U.S. Senate, and Sherrod Brown, Senator, U.S. Senate (Nov. 12, 2010), 
available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/kappos_sanders_brown_acta_ 
12nov2010.pdf. 
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answer or analysis.104  Meanwhile, the “USPTO provided technical advice 
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights to USTR.”105  Others 
argue that whether the ACTA can successfully “color within the lines of 
existing U.S. laws” is ultimately of little consequence.106  Regardless of 
the ACTA’s requirements for legal reform, it might simply be too 
expansive to fit within the constitutionally permitted exercise of the 
President’s executive power.107  By committing the United States to a new 
international framework for intellectual property enforcement, it opens the 
door to as-yet undetermined amendments.108  Indeed, an open letter from 
nearly eighty legal scholars vehemently opposes the agreement on this 
ground, among others.109  The USTR continues to characterize the 
agreement as an executive agreement rather than a treaty; a 
characterization described by scholars as possibly “unlawful.”110   
 
[21] Two existing provisions commonly argued as inconsistent with 
U.S. law are the sections on civil enforcement, addressing injunctions, 
                                                
104 See James Love, Non-Responsive Letter from David Kappos of USPTO to Senators 
Sanders and Brown Regarding ACTA Consistency with US Law, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY 
INT’L (Nov. 17, 2010, 12:56 PM), http://keionline.org/node/1022. 
 
105 VICTORIA A. ESPINEL, 2010 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 
COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 36 (2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_annual_report 
_feb2011.pdf. 
 
106 See Rob Pegoraro, Copyright Overreach Goes on World Tour, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/13/AR20091113 
00852_pf.html. 
 
107 See Sean Flynn, ACTA's Constitutional Problem, AM. U. (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/acta-s-constitutional-problem. 
 
108 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 5, art. 36; see also FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, ch. 
6, art. 42. 
 
109 See Letter from Brook Baker, Ne. Univ. Sch. of Law, et al. to Barack Obama, 
President, U.S. (Oct. 28, 2010), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-
post/academic-sign-on-letter-to-obama-on-acta [hereinafter Letter to Obama]. 
 
110 See id.; see also Sherwin Sly, The Trouble with ACTA, Am. Const. Soc. (Apr. 6, 
2010), http://www.acslaw.org/node/15774. 
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damages, and other remedies, and the section on border measures.111  
Although critics raised these arguments upon the release of earlier drafts 
of the agreement, the provisions remain in the finalized December 3 
version of the text.112  However, none of the inconsistencies actually 
require legal change.  Rather, the permissive language of the agreement 
allows enough flexibility that the legislature could enact new laws and 
remain in compliance. 
 
A.  Injunctions 
 
[22] If applied to patents, the injunction provision could conflict with 
current U.S. law.  The ACTA requires the availability of injunctive relief 
“to prevent goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual property 
right from entering into the channels of commerce,” except when adequate 
remuneration or compensation for infringement is available.113  This 
infringement provision appears in the civil enforcement section, which 
would apply to patents at the signatory’s discretion.114  If the United States 
does not exclude patents, the injunction requirements would exceed 
current U.S. law.  Currently, physicians performing best-practice medical 
procedures, though they may infringe a patent claim, are not liable for any 
damages or subject to an injunction against further use.115  Thus, the patent 
holder is denied both injunctive and monetary relief, contrary to the 
ACTA’s requirements.116  Similarly, a patent holder’s recovery is often 
significantly limited when the infringer is a state government.117 
                                                
111 See Love, supra note 104; see also FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 8-10; 
see also FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 3. 
 
112 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 8-10; see also FINAL TEXT, supra note 
3, at ch. 2, § 3. 
 
113 Id. at ch. 2, § 2, art. 8. 
 
114 See id. at ch. 2, § 2 n.2. 
 
115 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (1); 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1). 
 
116 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 7-9. 
 
117 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
641-44 (1999).  Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment protects state 
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[23] Michèle Rivasi of the European Parliament submitted a formal 
inquiry to the European Commission regarding whether the ACTA’s 
language would negatively impact access to generic medicine, especially 
in developing countries.118  The Commission responded by noting that the 
civil enforcement chapter’s provisions are permissive rather than 
obligatory, therefore do not require any country to impose restrictions on 
the trade of patent-protected goods.119  As noted, this provision will 
comply with current U.S. law only if its parent section is denied any 
application to patent law.120  For the ACTA to succeed as an executive 
agreement, the United States must choose to exclude patents from the 
section on injunctions. 
 
B.  Damages and Other Remedies 
 
[24] Under the ACTA, a court must have the authority to grant 
monetary damages to a rights holder as compensation for willful 
infringement.121  In determining damages, a court should consider “any 
legitimate measure of value the right holder submits, which may include 
lost profits, the value of the infringed goods or services measured by the 
market price, or the suggested retail price.”122   
 
[25] These requirements do not incorporate or allow for the exceptions 
currently in place under domestic law.  For example, U.S. law exempts the 
                                                                                                                     
governments against patent infringement suits in federal courts, so long as the state 
provides remedies that satisfy the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Id. 
 
118 See Michèle Rivasi, Parliamentary Questions: ACTA and Access to Medicine, EUR. 
PARLIAMENT (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ 
&reference=P-2010-9346&format=XML&language=EN.  
 
119 See Parliamentary Questions: Answer Given by Mr. De Gucht on Behalf of the 
Commission, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=P-2010-9346&language=EN. 
 
120 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006). 
 
121 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 9. 
 
122 Id. 
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National Archives and Records Administration from liability for any 
infringement of copyrights or related rights arising out of their official 
business of archival.123  Various other exemptions exist both in liability 
and in limitations on exclusive rights in the contexts of certain 
performances, secondary transmissions by satellite carriers, and secondary 
transmissions of network stations.124  Though it seems unlikely the ACTA 
intends to overwrite and eliminate these provisions, the text makes no 
explicit provision for them.125  
 
[26] Although critics claim that this omission creates an insolvable 
conflict,126 the ACTA does not require a court to always grant monetary 
damages, but merely authorizes it to do so.127  Awarding monetary 
damages for copyright infringement is well within the court’s available 
remedies, so the ACTA’s damages provision creates no conflict with U.S. 
law.128 
 
[27] The debate continues over whether to define the ACTA as a treaty 
or executive agreement.129  As distinguished by the U.S. Department of 
State, the principal difference between the two definitions is the 
                                                
123 See 44 U.S.C. § 2117 (2006). 
 
124 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 119 (a).  
 
125 See generally FINAL TEXT, supra note 3.  
 
126 See Grant Gross, New Version of ACTA Copyright Pact Gets Mixed Reviews, 
PCWORLD (Oct. 7, 2010, 5:30 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/ 
article/207227/new_version_of_acta_copyright_pact_gets_mixed_reviews.html; Declan 
McCullagh, Google Attorney Slams ACTA Copyright Treaty, CNET NEWS (May 7, 2010, 
10:58 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20004450-38.html. 
 
127 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3, at ch. 2, § 2, art. 9.  
 
128 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006). 
 
129 See Mike Masnick, BSA Falsely Claims ACTA Is A Treaty That Has Already Been 
Signed By 37 Countries, TECHDIRT (Oct. 12, 2010, 9:47 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101011/00590611356/bsa-falsely-claims-acta-is-a-
treaty-that-has-already-been-signed-by-37-countries.shtml. 
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requirement of Senate approval.130  Some ACTA supporters describe it as 
a treaty,131 while others persist with the executive agreement 
characterization.132  The European Commissioner for Trade refers to the 
ACTA as a treaty, but perhaps the distinction is lost outside of U.S. 
borders.133  
 
IV.  A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY 
 
[28] The ACTA’s negotiations have been “subject to intense but 
needless secrecy.”134  Leaked communications between the negotiating 
parties reveal prohibitively high secrecy.135  “The level of confidentiality 
in these ACTA negotiations has been set at a higher level than is 
customary for non-security agreements. . . . [I]t is impossible for member 
states to conduct necessary consultations with IPR stakeholders and 
legislatures under this level of confidentiality.”136   
 
                                                
130 See Treaty vs. Executive Agreement, supra note 26. 
 
131 See, e.g., Countries Representing More than Half of World Trade Agree to 
Criminalize Copyright Piracy, Including Software License Infringement by End Users, 
BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE (Oct. 6, 2010), available at http://www.bsa.org/country/ 
News%20and%20Events/News%20Archives/en/2010/en-10062010-acta.aspx. 
 
132 See, e.g., Thomas Sydnor, ACTA: USTR Was Right, and the Histrionics Were Wrong--
Again, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. (Apr. 23, 2010, 10:37 AM), http://blog.pff.org/ 
archives/2010/04/acta_ustr_was_right_and_the_histrionics_were_wrong.html. 
 
133 See Love, supra note 104. 
 
134 Letter to Obama, supra note 109. 
 
135 Even ACTA’s name obfuscates information.  Indeed, it is something of a misnomer.  
At its heart, “ACTA is not a counterfeiting treaty, but a copyright treaty.”  Michael Geist, 
The ACTA Internet Chapter: Putting the Pieces Together, MICHAEL GEIST (Nov. 3, 
2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4510/99999/. 
 
136 Viewing Cable 08ROME1337, BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT AND IPR -- FIRST 
SIGNS OF LIFE, WIKILEAKS (Feb. 3, 2011), http://wikileaks.ch//cable/2008/ 
11/08ROME1337.html.  
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[29] The United States and the European Union have likely been the 
most influential players upon the agreement’s development.137  Indeed, 
these parties have drafted the majority of changes between iterations.138  
Some commentators speculate that the finalized text compromises 
between the staunchly opposing views of these two parties.139  Though 
those with the most political and economic clout dominated the 
negotiations, other parties’ influences also influenced the outcome.  
Leaked agreements revealed commentary attributed to various other 
parties.140  Myriad lobbying groups provided input, but not all gained 
access to the secret negotiating drafts.141  In fact, the USTR provided 
drafts of the ACTA generated during negotiations to several U.S. 
corporations in advance of any authorized public access.142  A Swedish 
cable communication attributed statements to the European Union’s 
ACTA negotiator describing this imbalance of disclosure: “[T]he 
European Commission is concerned that the [U.S. government] has close 
                                                
137 See Michael Geist, ACTA Coming Down to Fight Between U.S. and Europe, MICHAEL 
GEIST (July 15, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5199/125/ (stating that 
“most of the agreement boils down to the U.S. v. the E.U.”). 
 
138 See id. 
 
139 See, e.g., Drew Wilson, ACTA Negotiations – US-EU Divide Being Settled, Text Being 
Finalized, ZEROPAID (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.zeropaid.com/news/90363/acta-
negotiations-us-eu-divide-being-settled-text-being-finalized/; see also EU-US Food Fight 
Hampers ACTA Talks, EURACTIV (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-
us-food-fight-hampers-acta-talks-news-496958. 
 
140 See, e.g., ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (Informal 
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft July 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/ACTA_consolidatedtext.pdf. 
 
141 See James Love, White House Shares the ACTA Internet Text with 42 Washington 
Insiders, Under Non Disclosure Agreements, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Oct. 13, 
2009, 16:10), http://keionline.org/node/660 (listing all “[p]ersons who received the 
ACTA Internet text who are members of ITAC 15 – the Industry Trade Advisory 
Committee on Intellectual Property Rights”.). 
 
142 See id (citing Table 1, which lists the “names of persons [and their respective 
companies] who received the documents under the NDA, or as members of the USTR 
advisory board . . . .”). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 4 
 
 22 
consultation with U.S. industry, while the EU does not have the same 
possibility . . . .”143 
 
[30] The USTR shared incomplete drafts with the upper crust of private 
industry, but refused to match this transparency with consumer rights 
groups, small businesses, or the general public.144  Freedom of 
Information Act requests targeting the negotiating drafts were denied, but 
they did uncover a list of names of those who received the ACTA Internet 
text either under Nondisclosure Agreement or as part of a USTR Advisory 
Board.145  These corporate members “included Google, eBay, Dell, Intel, 
Business Software Alliance, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, Sony 
Pictures, Time Warner, the Motion Picture Association of America, and 
Verizon.”146  The insight granted to and feedback gathered from these 
business giants undoubtedly provides them superior ammunition with 
which to lobby than that afforded to small businesses and individuals.  
Public Knowledge, one of only two non-commercial entities included on 
the special advisory committee, described the experience as a “minuscule 
glimpse” with “any suggestions [it] made go[ing] into a black box of a 
process.”147  Further compounding the agreement’s obscurity, the 
governmental offices responsible for negotiating the process failed to 
                                                
143 Viewing Cable 09STOCKHOLM736, CONCERNS ABOUT ACTA NEGOTIATIONS 
AND IPR UPDATE: IPRED, PIRATE BAY, AND VODDLER Ref: A) STOCKHOLM 733, 
B) STOCKHOLM 676 STOCKHOLM 00000736 001.2 OF 002, WIKILEAKS (Feb. 3, 
2011), http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/11/09STOCKHOLM736.html. 
 
144 See Love, supra note 141. 
 
145 See id. 
 
146 Ian Grant, ACTA Talks Focus on Three Strikes, No Appeal Deal for Software Pirates, 
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Nov. 4, 2009, 3:29 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/ 
Articles/2009/11/04/238414/Acta-talks-focus-on-three-strikes-no-appeal-deal-for-
software.htm. 
 
147 Sherwin Siy, ACTA Remains Closed: The Difference Between Inclusion and 
Transparency, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.publicknowledge.org/ 
node/2710. 
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release a draft until several years later.148  In fact, the first official public 
draft of the agreement released on April 20, 2010 – over three years since 
negotiations first began.149  
 
[31] Those in the public sector also experienced frustration over the 
transparency of the ACTA negotiations.  In August of 2010, the European 
Parliament passed a “[w]ritten declaration on the lack of a transparent 
process for the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement.”150  Though non-
binding, the declaration was still a victory for the transparency critics.151  
Since that time, negotiations have begun to open to the public eye.152  Four 
months later, in December of 2010, negotiations concluded.153  That 
month, the USTR requested from the public written commentary on the 
completed text.154  Yet, the request described the ACTA as “[c]onsistent 
with the Administration’s strategy for intellectual property enforcement” 
and “the highest-standard plurilateral agreement yet achieved concerning 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights . . . ”155  This language 
                                                
148 See ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (PUBLIC Predecisional/Deliberative 
Draft Apr. 2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/ 
tradoc_146029.pdf. 
 
149 See id. 
 
150 See Written Declaration on the Lack of a Transparent Process for the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and Potentially Objectionable Content, EUR. 
PARL. DOC. PE439.564v01-00 (2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+WDECL+P7-DCL-2010-0012+0+DOC+PDF+ 
V0//EN&language=EN. 
 
151 See Nate Anderson, European Parliament Passes Anti-ACTA Declaration, ARS 
TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/09/european-parliament-passes-
anti-acta-declaration.ars (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).  
 
152 See Michael Geist, The Trouble with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), SAIS REV., Summer-Fall 2010, available at http://muse.jhu.edu/ 
journals/sais_review/v030/30.2.geist.html. 
 
153 See FINAL TEXT, supra note 3. 
 
154 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Request for Comments from the Public, 75 
Fed. Reg. 79,069, 79,069 (Dec. 17, 2010). 
 
155 Id. 
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makes it seem that the USTR has already plotted its course and is not open 
to deviation.  If so, perhaps asking for commentary is merely an empty 
gesture, in which case the improved transparency is merely illusory.  
While little can be done to remedy past indiscretions and the lack of 
openness, perhaps the public dissatisfaction with the negotiation process 
will provide lessons moving forward. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[32] Despite apparent enthusiasm from certain segments of big-industry 
and government entities,156 the ACTA elicits skepticism from some and 
outright vehemence from others.157  Both official and unofficial leaked 
versions of the text have shed scarce insight to the otherwise taciturn 
developmental history of the agreement.158  The criticism targeting the 
ACTA stems not just from the shroud of secrecy enveloping its evolution, 
but also the substantive provisions advocated by the negotiating parties.159  
Indeed, a statement endorsed by “over 90 academics, practitioners and 
public interest organizations from six continents” noted the “public 
criticism of the unusually closed process and widespread disquiet over the 
negotiations’ presumed substance.”160  The group concluded “that the 
terms of the publicly released draft of [the] ACTA threaten numerous 
public interests, including every concern specifically disclaimed by 
negotiators.”161 
                                                                                                                     
 
156 See Barry Sookman, Support for ACTA Urged by Over 20 Leading Organizations, 
BARRY SOOKMAN (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.barrysookman.com/2009/11/20/support-
for-acta-urged-by-over-20-leading-organizations/. 
 
157 See, e.g., What is ACTA?, ANTI-ACTA, http://www.anti-acta.com/ (last visited Apr. 
10, 2011). 
 
158 See Michael Geist, ACTA Guide, Part Two: The Documents (Official and Leaked), 
MICHAEL GEIST (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4730/125/. 
 
159 See id.; see also Text of Urgent ACTA Communique – English, AM. U. (June 23, 
2010), http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique. 
 
160 Text of Urgent ACTA Communique - English, supra note 159. 
 
161 Id. 
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[33] At an extreme, some doubt the very constitutionality of the 
agreement.162  Yet the tides of iteration have washed away those 
provisions that would have required changes in U.S. law.  The remaining 
problem with the ACTA cannot be remedied so easily.  The pervasive lack 
of transparency has left the public feeling hoodwinked, now left only with 
the opportunity to provide an impotent critique of a finished product.  
Nonetheless, the ACTA forges on.  Indeed, by the time this Article 
reaches print, the ratification process will have begun.  
 
 
                                                
162 See, e.g., Sean Flynn, ACTA's Constitutional Problem, AM. U. (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/acta-s-constitutional-problem. 
